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InvestmentFollowing the food and energy price crises of themid 2000s, sub-Saharan Africa has become one of the larg-
est recipients for large-scale farmland investments. While much has been written on the phenomenon,
scant reliable empirical evidence is available as to the precise geographic and sectoral patterns and under-
lying drivers. Employing strict data quality requirements, this paper addresses these knowledge gaps by
analyzing 563 farmland projects that have been established between 2005 and 2013 in sub-Saharan Africa.
Findings show that the investment intensity and associated risks are not geographically uniform.Moreover,
the study highlights a number of popular misconceptions regarding investor origin and their sectoral
interests and motives.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
The conﬂuence of the commodity crises of the mid 2000s ex-
posed structural long-term global food and energy security issues
(Deininger, 2011; McMichael, 2012). In the context of increasingly
volatile commodity markets, rapidly growing global populations,
changing consumption patterns, ﬁnite fossil fuel supplies, and cli-
mate change, security of access to natural resources to produce
essential reproductive goods is becoming an economic imperative
(von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Zoomers, 2010; de Schutter,
2011). As the geographies of supply and demand consequently be-
come more distinct, the private sector is repositioning itself to
capitalize on the trade opportunities this creates (e.g. by control
of upstream value chain activities). As a result, recent years have
witnessed an unprecedented surge in demand for large areas of
farmland for the production of food crops and biofuel feedstocks
– especially in the global South, where fertile farmlands are
comparatively cheap and abundant.
Despite consensus that this trend signiﬁes structural changes in
the global economy and is, therefore, unlikely to be transient,
insufﬁcient empirical evidence is currently available about its pre-
cise scope and scale. Nevertheless, the media, academia, and civil
society organizations have tended to draw on exaggerated and
poorly substantiated area claims to illustrate the severity of the
global ‘land grab’, without questioning the credibility of underlyingdata. Such claims range from 15 to 20 million ha (von Braun and
Meinzen-Dick, 2009) and 56 million ha (World Bank, 2011), to a
staggering 203 (Anseeuw et al., 2012a) and 230 million ha (Kugel-
man, 2013). However, there are a number of problems with these
estimates. For example, since they cover different time periods, re-
gions, and sectors, they cannot be properly reconciled and com-
pared (Cotula and Polack, 2012). Moreover, due to the opacity of
deals that involve land and lack of reliable and publically accessible
information, such reports tend to rely heavily on (what is often
alarmist or speculative) media reports or crowd-sourcing, which
also introduces a selection bias (Schoneveld, 2011; Cotula, 2012;
Oya, 2013). Typically, they also neglect to adequately distinguish
between investments that are planned, under negotiation, or are
known to have failed. Without proper disaggregation, it is difﬁcult
to disentangle good from bad data.
That said, some though have questioned the utility of area-
based aggregation analyses altogether. Edelman (2013), for exam-
ple, considers this ‘‘fetishization of the hectares...to lead research-
ers and activists to ignore other...issues of scale, such as the capital
applied to the land, the control of supply chains, and the labour
relations’’ (p. 488). As pointed out by Rural Modernity (2012a)
and Scoones et al. (2013), when researchers circulate weak data
without proper qualiﬁcation that contributes to the perpetuation
of excessively simplistic, inaccurate, and counter-productive narra-
tives. One such example is the popular, but overstated, perception,
as Schoneveld (2011) and Bräutigam (2012) have already shown, of
China’s supposed ravenous demand for Africa’s farmland.
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ducing an analysis based on data that conforms to strict reliability
requirements and focusing exclusively on plantation production
systems.1 Rather than generating large aggregation ﬁgures, it applies
clearly deﬁned data quality categories to generate meaningful and
empirically-grounded insights into trends and associated risks and
opportunities. The analysis is focused exclusively on sub-Saharan
Africa; on the one hand, since early insights suggest it is a key invest-
ment beneﬁciary (World Bank, 2011; Anseeuw et al., 2012a,b), while
on the other, since the prevalence of relative insecure customary
property regimes and weak governance systems exacerbate the po-
tential adverse effects of large farmland investments, related, for
example, to displacement of customary land uses and environmental
degradation (Alden Wily, 2011; German et al., 2013; Schoneveld,
2013).
The following section highlights some of the key challenges in
quantifying the magnitude of farmland investments in sub-Saha-
ran Africa. Section ‘Methodology’ proceeds to discuss the method-
ological approach and Section ‘Understanding patterns of
investment’ presents the study’s key ﬁndings and identiﬁes the
main geographic and sectoral investment patterns. Section ‘Under-
standing potential host country impacts’ reﬂects on the potential
impacts of these farmland investments, focusing on land use com-
petition and domestic food and energy security. Finally, the paper
concludes with a reﬂection on ﬁndings and implications for
governance.Challenges in quantifying large-scale farmland investments
One of the key challenges in quantifying farmland investments
in sub-Saharan Africa is that comprehensive and disaggregated
data is not made publically available by most host governments.
While the political sensitivity of these investments often restricts
the level of public access to this data, in most cases, data is not con-
solidated and maintained in a central location – implying that the
government itself is often unaware of its precise scope and scale.
Frequently, the ministries that allocate land titles to investors have
highly antiquated, non-computerized land registry systems. In
some cases, this is further complicated when land administration
functions are decentralized (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), Ghana, and Nigeria), which often implies that
centralized records are either nonexistent or incomplete.
As a result of these challenges, as mentioned, most information
is obtained from media reports. The data presented by von Braun
and Meinzen-Dick (2009), Görgen et al. (2009), Friis and Reenberg
(2010), and World Bank (2011), for example, were all based exclu-
sively on media reports – most of which obtained from the GRAIN
blog, farmlandgrab.org. However, when scrutinizing blog entries,
numerous reports of multi-million hectare mega-deals can be
found that never materialized or have turned out to be much smal-
ler in extent than initially claimed – the inclusion of such invest-
ments tends to generate heavily skewed results.2 The Land
Matrix, an independent initiative for monitoring land deals that
was launched in April, 2012, while drawing on research reports
and other more reliable data sources, has struggled with similar
issues.3 Figures of total land deals exceeding 200 million ha that1 Plantations are an economic unit producing agricultural commodities for sale and
employing a relatively large number of unskilled laborers whose activities are closely
supervised.
2 These include, for example, 10 million ha by South African farmers organization
Agri SA that in reality concerned only 80,000 ha and two Chinese deals – ZTE in DRC
and Wuhan Kaidi in Zambia for 2.8 and 2.0 million ha respectively, which turned out
to be 100,000 ha and 79,300 ha (Schoneveld, 2011).
3 The Land Matrix initiative is an investment inventory relying on crowd-sourcing,
led by the International Land Coalition (ILC). It included projects that were
established after January 1, 2000, and exceed 200 ha in size.were quoted in Anseeuw et al. (2012a), Oxfam (2012), and Kugelman
(2013) originated from the Land Matrix initiative. Although it em-
ployed data quality categories, the heavily cited initial version in-
cluded without any distinctions both veriﬁed and unveriﬁed deals
and even deals that had failed or were still under negotiation or
planned.4 Since early criticisms, the Land Matrix has signiﬁcantly
improved the quality of its dataset; by the time the second version
of the Land Matrix was launched in June, 2013, its global estimate
of ﬁnalized land deals had been revised downwards to 42.3 mil-
lion ha; 20.2 million ha of which located in Africa. While the current
version now does distinguish between the statuses of different deals,
it has altogether abandoned its system of reliability codes. Since it
now publishes data sources, it was argued that users are better posi-
tioned to make their own judgment about data quality (Anseeuw
et al., 2013). However, since many data users neglect to be sufﬁ-
ciently critical of the integrity of underlying data, it is questionable
whether this decision will contribute to more accurate and respon-
sible reporting.5
Another methodological challenge relates to how different sec-
tors should be treated in an aggregated analysis of this sort, partic-
ularly when the analysis is based around area ﬁgures. For example,
commercial pressures on land are also prevalent in the mining,
tourism, real estate, infrastructure, and conservation sectors (Zoo-
mers, 2010). Since the underlying drivers and the innate environ-
mental and developmental impacts of land acquisitions are
highly speciﬁc to different sectors and business models, comparing
these on the basis of area ﬁgures does not enable us to draw mean-
ingful conclusions.
For example, in cases of land allocated for spatially extensive
activities, such as mineral prospecting or industrial logging, the ex-
tent of impact on land use and rights of access tends to be more
limited than plantation production systems. In industrial logging
concessions in Africa, concessionaires typically only have the right
to harvest timber (selectively) and are often subject to a harvesting
quota (e.g. allowable annual cut). Unlike plantations, where in
most cases, though not all, the entire ‘bundle of rights’ is affected,
in logging concessions this is usually limited to timber withdrawal
rights (Karsenty, 2011). On the other hand, since the area under
commercial logging concessions is manifold larger than that under
plantation production systems, their impact, while less intensive,
may certainly be more extensive. For example, in Central Africa,
30–40% of remaining forest is under concession, with numerous
individual companies holding rights to areas covering several mil-
lions of hectares (Karsenty, 2007; Clark et al., 2009). Similarly, land
privately acquired for conservation (e.g. for the purpose of ecotour-
ism and carbon ﬁnance) is unlikely to entail environmentally det-
rimental land use changes and is more likely to have had some
form of protected status prior to acquisition (Carter et al., 2008),
thus reducing, though certainly not eliminating, the risk of conﬂict
with customary land uses and ecosystem services. In the Land Ma-
trix’s third largest investment recipient, South Sudan, a 2.28 mil-
lion ha management contract for an existing national park is
equivalent to approximately half the total area ‘acquired’ in the
country, while in its largest and fourth largest investment recipi-
ents, Papua New Guinea and the DRC, more than three-quarters
of the area acquired constitutes logging concessions (Land Matrix,
2013). Including these investments in the calculus will cause to
overstate the magnitude of investment and associated risks and
undermines the utility of cross-country comparisons.4 See communications between the ILC and the commentators of the Rural
Modernity blog; Rural Modernity (2012b).
5 A number of authors have nevertheless used such data to draw strong conclusions
on trends and outcomes. Notable examples published in prestigious media include
Deininger (2011) and Arezki et al. (2011) using the World Bank (2011) dataset and
Sassen (2013) and Rulli et al. (2013) using the Land Matrix.
Table 1
Distribution of data on farmland investments > 2000 ha by type of data source.
Type of data source Area acquired (ha) Number of projects
Company sources 6,258,652 139
Contracts 4,455,446 62
ESIA/PIN documents 1,760,777 43
Field research activities 867,369 19
Government sources 4,936,033 174
Media reports 980,659 34
Other research 3,468,521 103
36 G.C. Schoneveld / Food Policy 48 (2014) 34–50For many other types of investments pertinent to the land grab
debate, such as mineral extraction, real estate, industrial develop-
ment, and much of the tourism sector (with the exception of pri-
vate conservation areas), the average allocated area of land tends
to be a fraction of that for large-scale plantations. However, that
does not imply that the impacts of these types of investments
are more limited. For example, while the degree of direct land
use change and impact on land use rights are generally more lim-
ited, indirect impacts may be more profound as a result of high lev-
els of in-migration, economic spill-overs, rapidly rising land values,
and pollution. Area data for such sectors is, therefore, unlikely to be
a useful indicator of impact, especially when applied for purposes
of cross-sectoral comparison or aggregation.
Methodology
Land acquisition analysis
The analysis of the geographic and sectoral patterns of large-
scale farmland investments is based on a dataset of projects devel-
oped from October 2008 to July 2013. The analysis includes only
those projects from the forestry and agricultural sector that are en-
gaged in plantation production models. It excludes agricultural and
forestry investments adopting smallholder-oriented business mod-
els (e.g. tenant farming or outgrower schemes), industrial logging
concessions, and livestock. The projects incorporated into the anal-
ysis involve the transfer of use or ownership rights over contiguous
areas of land larger than 2000 ha in all countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, without discriminating between investor origin, type, and
orientation.6 In the African context, such transfers are realized over-
whelmingly through leasehold agreements, with freehold interests
in land rarely recognized by law. Only land transfer agreements that
were entered into after January 2005 are included. This date was ta-
ken as the cut-off date due to signiﬁcant changes in global market
conditions for relevant commodities since that time.7
In recognition of the methodological challenges discussed in
Section ‘Methodology’ and the importance of distinguishing be-
tween data on the basis of reliability, collected data was divided
into three quality categories (see also Table 1). The three categories
are as follows:
 Category 1: Data in this category represents data with the high-
est level of accuracy and is derived exclusively from the follow-
ing data sources:
 leasehold or land sale contracts;
 environmental impact assessments and associated
documents;
 government databases and registries, maintained by, for
example, land, investment or agricultural ministries;
 ofﬁcial government communications (e.g. parliamentary
meetings, press releases, presentations);6 Although this area is admittedly arbitrary, with the concept of ’large-scale’ and
’commercial/industrial’ used for census purposes differing greatly between countries,
the 2000 ha threshold used by Rahmato (2011) and in Ethiopia is here considered as a
reasonably accurate representation of large-scale plantation production systems in
sub-Saharan Africa. Although 100–2000 ha plantations are still large by African
standards and are more likely to capture large numbers of domestic investors, they
are difﬁcult to accurately identify. For example, in many countries, only ministers or
presidents can approve land deals exceeding a certain area threshold (typically for
areas larger than 1000–2000 ha); with smaller deals only requiring district or
provincial-level approval. The inclusion of such deals would, therefore, impose
numerous methodological challenges.
7 The food price crisis was generally thought to span the period early 2007 to mid
2008. The oil price crisis was prompted by more gradual inﬂation starting from early
2005, before climaxing in mid 2008. ofﬁcial company communications (e.g. annual reports, press
releases, corporate presentations);
 ﬁnancial databases (e.g. home country corporate registries,
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters);
 personal communications with key public and private sector
actors;
 in-country research by the Center for International Forestry
Research (CIFOR) and its partners and Master’s and Ph.D.
students conducting research under the Netherlands IS Land
Academy (LANDac), hosted by Utrecht University.
Data from these sources is only included when the land transfer
agreement is legally enforceable and it is explicitly indicated that
the agreement has been ﬁnalized. This category also includes con-
ditional land lease agreements. This concerns contractualized
agreements that land of pre-speciﬁed extent is to be allocated once
performance requirements are met. Data from other research pa-
pers is included only when data is obtained from Category 1
sources, each entry is properly referenced, and there are no reasons
to question the research’s integrity.
 Category 2: Data in this category represents the lowest level of
data accuracy that is included in the analysis. It includes sec-
ondary data sources that do not explicitly specify data origin,
such as some media reports and research publications. Data
from these sources is only included when the following three
conditions are met: (i) there are no conﬂicting reports or rea-
sons to doubt data validity, (ii) it is expressly indicated that a
land agreement has been ﬁnalized, and (iii) supplementary
information on investor operations is available in the form of
corporate websites, entries into company registries, or the allo-
cation of investment licenses.
 Category 3: Data that does not fall into the above two categories
is omitted from this analysis. Land agreements that are not leg-
ally enforceable (e.g. memoranda of understanding and good-
faith agreements), that are in the process of being negotiated,
and land areas based on projected expansion plans are, thereby,
excluded.
While some projects included in this analysis have had their
land titles revoked, bankrupted, or permanently ceased operations,
data from these projects has been incorporated. By and large, pro-
jects are either acquired by other operators, the land is sub-leased,
reallocated by the government for other commercial purposes, or is
permanently alienated from the customary domain (e.g. due to
reclassiﬁcation to state land). When land is sub-leased or re-ac-
quired by another operator, entries are not double counted.
Although this study sought to overcome some of the key meth-
odological challenges, it recognizes that limitations remain. For
example, it may under-represent domestic projects. These may
be less ‘publically visible’ and less likely to be documented by
the public administration, as they are often less closely monitored
than foreign investments. Additionally, investments in some coun-
tries may not be captured as well as in others due to decentralized
Table 2
Summary of farmland investments > 2000 ha.
Variable Area (ha) Number of projects
Total area acquired 22,727,457 563
Category 1 data (total) 19,275,506 481
Category 1 data (conditional) 1,358,800 11
Category 2 3,451,951 82
Mean 40,368 –
Median 12,300 –
G.C. Schoneveld / Food Policy 48 (2014) 34–50 37information management, controls on public access to information,
or weaker regulatory oversight and/or administrative capacity.
Land use competition analysis
Section ‘Threat of land use competition’ assesses the potential
availability of agro-ecologically suitable land in the different coun-
tries and contrasts this with the area of land acquired by docu-
mented investment projects to determine relative risk of land
use conﬂicts. This was calculated by overlaying land classiﬁed as
protected, forested, artiﬁcial, and under cultivation and land with
a population density of more than 20 persons per square kilometer
with agro-ecologically suitable land.8 Agro-ecologically suitable
lands were considered those where moderate to very high yields
are attainable (Suitability Index > 25) under high inputs and under
both rain-fed and irrigated conditions (derived from IIASA (2012)).
Forested land involved spatially merging all land with a forest cover
of more than 15% and all permanently cultivated and mosaic farm-
land, permanent pasture, and land fallowed for 5 years or less (both
derived from ESA (2011)). Protected areas include all areas, including
non-IUCN recognized areas, where plantations are legally restricted
(derived from UNEP (2012)). The land use analysis was performed
using geographic information systems (GIS).Understanding patterns of investment
A total of 563 projects larger than 2000 ha were identiﬁed
across 37 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, covering an area of
22,727,457 ha (Table 2).9 This is equivalent to 9.60% of the total area
harvested in the region in 2012 (calculated from FAO (2013)).
19,275,506 ha fulﬁll the Category 1 requirements (of which
1,358,800 being conditional) and 3,451,951 ha the Category 2
requirements. The median project size is 12,300 ha and the mean
project size 40,368 ha. The largest 10% accounted for 54.4% of the to-
tal area acquired, with 53 projects having gained access to areas in
excess of 100,000 ha.
Target countries
The total areas of land acquired vary greatly between countries
(Fig. 1), indicating that this rush for farmland in the region is not
uniform in intensity. For example, the six countries (Ethiopia, Gha-
na, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Sudan, and Zambia) where
more than 1.5 million ha have been acquired constitute 52.8% of
the total area acquired, while, collectively, they cover only 17.0%
of sub-Saharan Africa’s surface area. On the basis of category 1 land
acquisitions, excluding conditional allocations, the largest area is
acquired in Mozambique. When aggregating all data categories,
Ethiopia is the largest recipient, both in terms of area acquired
and in number of investments (see Appendix A for a tabulated
overview).
Why these countries have become such desirable investment
destinations is, however, not immediately self-evident. Employing
statistical analyses for this purpose does not yield any conclusive
insights (Table 3). For example, while a relationship might be ex-
pected between the area of land acquired and the availability of
agro-ecologically suitable land, no statistical relationship is8 Population density is used merely as a ﬁnal control variable – the vast majority of
land that is permanently settled is already accounted for by the anthropogenic land
use categories (e.g. agricultural land).
9 For the purpose of this analysis, a legal entity constitutes a project. Therefore,
should one company be developing numerous plantations, each with different legal
partners, then each plantation is considered a separate project. By this deﬁnition,
therefore, if the same legal entity, with the same partners, is developing numerous
plantations, then these plantations are all considered to be part of a single project.discernible. Relatively small countries with a scarcity of suitable
land (e.g. Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) have become key
investment recipients, while other countries with abundant re-
serves of suitable and available land (e.g. Angola and the DRC) have
not. Additionally, there is no statistically signiﬁcant correlation
with political stability or public security, as is illustrated by invest-
ment ﬂows to countries such as Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Nigeria.
Relative ease of doing business is neither an outcome determinant.
While some governments, notably in Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, and
Republic of Congo, were able to successfully attract large farmland
investors by direct and centralized allocation of land, countries
such as Ghana, Madagascar, and Mozambique became major
investment destinations despite more convoluted land acquisition
procedures.
Moreover, country selection could arguably be inﬂuenced by
domestic market needs and opportunities. However, this does
not appear to be an underlying determinant of investment either,
as is illustrated by the weak relationship with such indicators as
the national agricultural trade balance, vulnerability to oil price
shocks, and the Global Hunger Index. Although exploitation of gov-
ernance deﬁciencies could generate economic opportunities, no in-
verse relationship could be observed between investment intensity
and, for example, quality of natural resource governance, labor
rights, and land tenure security either. This contradicts ﬁndings
from the World Bank (Arezki et al., 2011; Deininger, 2011) that
suggest investors speciﬁcally target countries with weak tenure re-
gimes. This is illustrated by the fact that countries that afford some
of the most far-reaching protection to customary land rights (e.g.
Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia – see Alden Wily,
2011, 2012a; Amanor, 2012), have nevertheless become major
farmland investment destinations.
Clearly, generalisations and statistical tests of this sort do not do
justice to the complex interplay of unique factors that shape a
country’s relative attractiveness as a farmland investment destina-
tion. Ultimately, investments are driven by a host of insufﬁciently
quantiﬁable variables at the level of the individual investors, such
as, for example, historical, cultural, and political relations between
host and home country, access to local social and business net-
works, regulatory provisions conducive to particular crops, estab-
lished domestic markets and infrastructure, market orientation,
and agro-ecological conditions – as the following sections will also
show.Target crops and sectors
Analysis of target crops highlights clear biases towards certain
types of crops. For example, investments into oilseed cultivation
constitute 60.4% of the total area acquired, followed by timber
and pulpwood trees (15.0%) and sugar crops (13.2%) (Fig. 2). With
investments into food crop cultivation, such as cereals, roots and
tubers, and vegetables collectively accounting for 6.7% of the area
acquired, albeit with some curious exceptions, many investors ap-
pear inclined to focus on the cultivation of traditional export/cash
crops and typically within areas where investors can capitalize on
established systems of production, markets, appropriately skilled
labor, and physical infrastructure.
Fig. 1. Major investment destinations > 2000 ha, by total land area acquired.
Table 3
Bivariate correlations for area of land acquired by country.
Explanatory variable Description Pearson’s correlation
coefﬁcient
Signiﬁcance (2-
tailed)
Availability of suitable land Total area of agro-ecologically suitable land that is potentially available (derived from ESA
(2011), IIASA (2012) and UNEP (2012))
0.28 0.313
Ease of Doing Business
ranking
The conduciveness of the regulatory environment to business operations (IFC, 2012) 0.377 0.107
Foreign land ownership The extent to which non-nationals, in practice, have the right to access land (CEPII, 2009) 0.072 0.726
Global Hunger Index Prevalence of undernourishment, underweight children, and child mortality (IFPRI, 2012) 0.256 0.216
Land tenure security Proportion of rural population with no formally registered land rights (CEPII, 2009) 0.112 0.593
Net agricultural trade Difference between the value of exports and imports of agricultural commodities (FAO, 2013) 0.121 0.645
Political stability Perceived likelihood that government will be overthrown or destabilized (World Bank,
2013a)
0.042 0.842
Public security Domestic incidence of violent disputes (CEPII, 2009) 0.061 0.766
Quality of natural resource
governance
Transparency of management of income orienting from natural resource industries (CEPII,
2009)
0.143 0.573
Respect for laws Perceived extent to which societal rules are followed and contracts enforced (World Bank,
2013a)
0.113 0.582
Respect for worker rights Level of observance of labor rights and measures (CEPII, 2009) 0.086 0.678
Vulnerability to oil price
shocks
Value of net oil imports relative to GDP (derived from EIA (2012) and World Bank (2013b)) 0.191 0.383
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arcane, the second and third largest crop in terms of area acquired
(21.8% and 12.9%, respectively).10 These investments tend to con-
centrate in regions with long histories in their cultivation. For exam-
ple, 57 of the 67 documented oil palm investments are located in the
coastal areas of West Africa and in Central Africa, where humid-trop-
ical conditions are especially suitable for oil palm. Under French and
Belgian colonial administration and during the statist period follow-
ing decolonialization, these areas developed large plantation econo-
mies; both through smallholder cultivation and European and state-
owned enterprise. However, as a result of civil and political turmoil
that ensued in many of these countries, most large plantations were
abandoned in the 1970s and 1980s (Hill, 1977; Eicher and Baker,
1982).11 Only Cote’ d’Ivoire remained a net palm oil exporter (FAO,
2013). This new wave of oil palm investors has to date targeted in10 Other crops within the ’sugar crops’ category include sweet sorghum and sugar
beets. However, they constitute only a fraction of the area acquired.
11 Some major companies that established plantations under colonial rule have
continued to operate plantations; these include Bolloré/Socﬁn (France), SIAT
(Belgium), and Unilever (UK). The latter has in recent years divested most of its
plantation assets, while those of the former two remain operational (but only a few of
their plantations are captured in this analysis, since many were established prior to
2005).particular Sierra Leone (511,045 ha), Republic of Congo
(644,000 ha), and Liberia (948,749 ha); most of which established
with direct government support in acquiring land. With govern-
ments in countries such as Cameroon and Nigeria also actively court-
ing large oil palm investors in order to recapture their position as
major palm oil exporters (Hoyle and Levang, 2012; Schoneveld,
2013), other countries in the region are also destined to become ma-
jor investment recipients. Since oil palm tends to deplete the soil of
its nutrients towards the end of its commercial life, despite the
abundance of abandoned or neglected estates, only 15 of the 67 pro-
jects involved the rehabilitation of previously established estates.
Sugarcane investors, on the other hand, have in recent years
principally targeted the traditional sugar cultivating areas in East-
ern and SouthernAfrica, involving 50 out of the 70 documented sug-
arcane projects.12 Having become one of themost proﬁtable crops for
British settler farmers in the late 1800s, due to its economic potential
and the prevalence of dumping practices on international sugar mar-
kets, in most countries in the region the sector long attracted state12 These two regions account for approximately 86% of sugarcane output in sub-
Saharan Africa (FAO, 2013). Many countries in the region are also some of the most
efﬁcient producers in the world (both in terms of yield and cost of production)
(Roseboom, 2007).
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produced (especially state-controlled) monopolies. However, in the
context of neoliberal reforms and the harmonization of pricing poli-
cies as a result of regional economic integration (Johnson and Rosil-
lo-Calle, 2007), most state sugar production assets were privatized
in the late 1990s and conditions became increasing amenable to com-
petition. The largest recipients of sugarcane investments are Ethiopia
(529,583 ha) andMozambique (337,604 ha), where sugarcane is con-
sidered a priority crops and incentives are in place to promote private
investment (Schoneveld and Shete, 2014; Dias, 2013). With most es-
tates privatized before 2005, only 12 of 70 documented projects in-
volved previously established estates.
Interestingly, other major African cash/export crops, such as, for
example, coffee, tea, cocoa, rubber, tobacco, and cotton, have re-
ceived only limited investor interest. For all, bar rubber, the food
price crisis of 2007/2008 had a comparatively minor inﬂationary
effect and global market conditions have remained comparatively
stable.13 Global sugar and palm oil markets, on the other hand, have
exhibited considerably more volatility, with long-term market pros-
pects appearing especially strong. This has numerous contributing
factors. With rapidly rising per capita purchasing power and chang-
ing consumption patterns, strong demand is anticipated from the
emerging economies China and India; expected to become the larg-
est two net importers of these commodities, predominantly for use
in the food sector (FAPRI, 2011; OECD–FAO, 2011). Moreover,
national and international trade policies have tended to favor
Africa-based producers. Under the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) treaty
with the European Union (EU) and the Africa Growth and Opportu-
nities Act (AGOA) in the United States (US) all products derived from
both crops are exempt from duty payments and quotas when they
originate from an African Lesser Development Country (LDC).14 In
the case of palm oil, this advantage is compounded by the substan-
tial export tariffs imposed in the largest international palm oil pro-
ducers Indonesia and Malaysia to protect against shortages within
their domestic markets. Since most African countries are also large
net importers of both sugar and palm oil and domestic prices gener-
ally exceed international prices (Garside et al., 2005; Hardman,
2011), processes of regional economic integration provide investors
with ample regional prospects. Additionally, the deregulation of the
global sugar market and increasing difﬁculties for investors in Indo-
nesia and Malaysia to access land for oil palm expansion (e.g. in an
effort to curb deforestation) has created competitive pressures to
seek new avenues for reducing cost of production. With land prices
in much of sub-Saharan Africa rarely exceeding US$5 per ha per an-
num (Schoneveld, 2013), as compared to between US$200 and 400 in
Southeast Asia and between US$150 and 300 in major large-scale
farming areas in Latin America (Manciana et al., 2009; Olam,
2010), and with land market liberalization of the 1990s, easy access
to cheap land is undeniably a major driver.
The most important driver underlying the renewed investor
interest in these crops, especially in contrast to other traditional
cash/export crops, is arguably the (perceived) rise in demand for
ﬁrst-generation biofuels. As illustrated by Fig. 3, 54.2% of investors13 Of the major cash crops, prices in the rubber sector have been most favorable over
recent years – by 2011, international market prices had increased almost tenfold over
2000 levels. While a number of defunct rubber estates were acquired in West Africa,
investors have curiously shown little interests in the development of Greenﬁeld
plantations. As noted by Byerlee (2013), with most large tire companies having
signiﬁcantly downscaled their direct participation in rubber cultivation, rubber is
produced primarily by Chinese companies, which have tended to focus their
cultivation activities in nearby Laos and Cambodia.
14 African countries not eligible under the EBA, but who were signatories of the
unilaterally abrogated African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc (ACP) Sugar Protocol are also
eligible for duty- and quota-fee access to the EU market. ACP countries also received
US$ 1.2 billion from the EU as adaption support for market deregulation (Roseboom,
2007).target to varying degrees the biofuel end-market. Following the oil
price crisis and the enactment of domestic blending mandates in
many industrialized countries over the 2000s, particularly the US
and the EU are expected to become major biofuel consumers; by
2020 they are projected to account for 67.1% of global biofuel con-
sumption and 81.2% of imported biofuels (derived from FAPRI
(2011) and OECD–FAO (2011)).15 Oil palm and sugarcane are the
cheapest and most productive biofuel feedstocks, as compared to
common alternatives such as rapeseed, soybean, and maize (Kojima
and Johnson, 2005). An added advantage of these crops is that their
fungibility enables producers to hedge against market ﬂuctuations
(Hall, 2011; Borras et al., 2013); therefore, producers can easily
switch between end-markets to capitalize on price differentials.
The prominent role of global biofuel market prospects in driving
investment in sub-Saharan Africa is further illustrated by the area
acquired for the purpose of cultivating Jatropha Curcas L. (jatro-
pha); an inedible oilseed bearing shrub touted for its purported
ability to generate high yields under arid and low input conditions.
Despite it being a largely undomesticated crop for which little
agronomic experience has been gained and with only one econom-
ically signiﬁcant end-use, in the period 2007–2009 many investors
sought to cultivate it on an industrial scale. Jatropha investments
accounted for 96 projects and 31.1% of the total area acquired; with
the largest areas acquired in Madagascar (979,610 ha), Zambia
(707,476 ha), and Ghana (671,951 ha). Due to the variety of agro-
ecological conditions under which the crop can be cultivated and
with no established markets, unlike oil palm and sugarcane, no
clear geographic patterns can be discerned, with investments
spread across 20 countries.
Where the comparatively high start-up costs associated with oil
palm and sugarcane projects has largely attracted established agri-
businesses or industrial conglomerates, most jatropha investors
were poorly capitalized start-ups. Lack of experience, inabilities
to raise operational funds as a result of the Financial Crisis, bad
publicity, and unrealistic and poorly substantiated business plans
have led to the failure of most jatropha projects. Only rarely have
investors realized projected yield; although many ceased their
operations well before the plant reached maturity (5–7 years).
Investors typically switched to more conventional crops, tempo-
rarily ceased operations awaiting funds, or sold assets to new
investors. However, as more agronomic experience is being gained
and genetic improvement programs are starting to commercialize
high yielding and non-toxic cultivars, it may be too early to dismiss
jatropha projects altogether. Ongoing policy dialogues in the EU
that proposes to restrict the use of food-based biofuels could also
improve market prospects for non-edible feedstocks such as
jatropha.
Although the initial rise in interest for Africa’s farmland is
attributable largely to the incipient biofuel sector, over the 2010s
this has increasingly given way to food crop investors. While most
food projects focus on sugarcane and oil palm, rice is becoming an
increasingly important investor crop, responsible for 76.4% of the
area acquired for cereal investment.16 Rice investments are mostly
located within traditional rice growing areas, especially West Africa
and to a lesser extent East Africa, with the largest investments lo-
cated in Tanzania (69,124 ha), Mali (142,400 ha) and Nigeria
(163,122 ha). Despite it being a major staple crop in West Africa,15 The EU Renewable Energy Directive, implemented in 2010, requires that 10% of
energy consumption in the transportation sectors be derived from renewable energy
sources by 2020. The 2010 US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) sets annual blending
targets for the transportation sector, rising to approximately 7% of total fuel
consumption for the sector by 2022. Largely as a result of these mandates, global
consumption increased from 35 billion to 129 billion liters per year between 2005
and 2011 (EIA, 2012).
16 Rice typically has a higher return on investment and produces more energy and
protein per hectare than other cereal crops (Kiple and Ornelas, 2000; UNEP, 2005).
Fig. 2. Primary crop (type) cultivated, as proportion of total land area acquired. Note: Projects that plan to cultivate a number of different crops are only included in these
ﬁgures when they specify that they are primarily targeting the cultivation of one crop. Many large projects that cultivate a wide range of different crops are excluded since
disaggregated area ﬁgures were rarely provided.
17 For the purpose of this analysis, ’Europe’ constitutes the 27 countries of the
European Union (EU) plus Norway and Switzerland.
18 BITs with the UK are in force in 12 sub-Saharan African countries and with the US
in six countries.
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food price crisis, governments have increasingly been leveraging
public funds to enhance rice self-sufﬁciency, including lending sup-
port to private investors (WARDA, 2007; SWAG-OECD, 2011). While
incentives and local market prospects have been integral to promot-
ing investment, the food price crisis has also highlighted the risk of
dependency on major Asian rice producers; many of which imposed
rice export bans to protect domestic markets (Slayton, 2009).
Although a smaller number of other cereal projects (e.g. maize and
wheat) were established in Eastern and Southern Africa – typically
on former state cereal farms – due to disproportionately high trans-
port costs and comparatively small proﬁts margins, investors have
tended to favor conditions in countries such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
and Russia (World Bank, 2011; Byerlee, 2013).
In contrast to agriculture, forestry has not been a major driver of
farmland investments; responsible for 15.0% of the total area ac-
quired. Most forestry projects target the wood products end-mar-
ket (e.g. construction, pulp and paper), with approximately one
third of the projects targeting the biofuel market (e.g. electricity
generation, briquette production). The most widely cultivated tree
species are, in descending order, eucalyptus, pine, acacia and teak.
Almost 64% of the area acquired is attributable to projects in Ghana
(426,364 ha) and Mozambique (1,130,725 ha). Northern Mozam-
bique has become a prime area for plantation forestry in particular;
largely due to efforts by the local non-proﬁt organization, Malonda
Foundation, in attracting and facilitating large forestry investments
in the area.
Investor origin
With regards to investor origin, few lead investors were found
to be of domestic origin. Of the 520 projects for which investor ori-
gin could be established, only 102 projects, accounting for 13.9% of
the total area acquired, had a local operator leading the develop-
ment – highlighting the critical enabling role of international cap-
ital in driving large-scale farmland investments. Of greater interest
is that the data conﬁrms that traditional investors from industrial-
ized countries are the dominant farmland investors, rather than
wealthy Gulf or East Asian countries, as has been popularly de-
picted in the media and by some researchers (see Smaller and
Mann, 2009; Görgen et al., 2009; Friis and Reenberg, 2010; AFP,
2011; Economist, 2011; New Scientist, 2011; Reuters, 2011; Ans-
eeuw et al., 2012a). As illustrated by Fig. 4 and in the AppendixA, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US are the two largest inves-
tors by a considerable margin, followed by India. From a regional
perspective, Europe is clearly the dominant investor region,
responsible for 40.5% of the total area acquired, following by Asia
(19.4%) and North America (15.0%).17
For some investor countries, clear patterns emerge when scru-
tinizing target countries. For example, in the case of Portugal, 10
of its 20 investments have been made in Angola and 9 in Mozam-
bique (the only Lusophone countries in Africa), while in the case of
France, 16 out of its 20 projects are located within Francophone
Africa. Clearly, linguistic and historical links play an important role
in the investment decisions of investors from these countries.
However, in the case of the UK, this is less apparent; with only
31 out of its 57 projects located in Anglophone Africa. The only
other statistical outlier is the relatively high concentration of In-
dian investors in Ethiopia, where 18 of its 48 projects are located.
Interviews with Indian investors showed that diplomatic ties be-
tween their respective governments, security of large numbers of
other Indian investors, and cultural similarities were important
drivers.
While such afﬁnities partially explain some of these geographic
patterns, some authors have pointed at legalistic dimensions. For
example, it is argued that investor decisions are shaped by the
existence of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) between host and
home government that offer inter alia legal protection against
expropriation and unfavorable changes in host country legal
frameworks and enables international arbitration in case of dis-
putes (see, for example, Malik, 2011; Perez et al., 2011; AldenWily,
2012b). The data, however, does not conﬁrm any such relationship;
a BIT between Angola and Portugal has yet to come into force, as
has a BIT between India and Ethiopia (there are currently no BITs
in force between India and a country in sub-Saharan Africa). For
the two largest investors, UK and US, only 26 out of 57 projects
and 17 out of 41 projects, respectively, are governed by BITs.18
As regards the sectoral focus of different investor countries,
more distinctive patterns emerge. The prominent role of European
investors is largely an illustration of the perceived long-term de-
mand for biofuels in their markets of origin; with European inves-
Fig. 3. Primary end-market, as proportion of total land area acquired. * In addition
to biofuel end-markets, integrated food and fuel projects target food end-markets
as a secondary distribution outlet; typically the case for sugarcane and oil palm
projects. The relative contribution to each market typically depends on global price
differentials between the different end products (e.g. between crude palm oil and
biodiesel).
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(5,451,109 ha) and European biofuel projects accounting for
62.4% of the land acquired by European investors. These ﬁndings
strongly contradict an EC-supported evaluation of the impacts of
its renewable energy policies, which claims that ‘‘between 50,000
and 160,000 ha of land deals with concerns about socioeconomic
impacts and land-use rights could be linked to the EU market’’
(EC, 2013, pp. 302). Coincidentally, the three countries that are ex-
pected to become the largest net importers of biofuels in the EU by
2020, the UK, Germany, and Italy, are also the most active Euro-
pean biofuel investors in sub-Saharan Africa, both in terms of area
acquired and number of projects.19
Since most large oil palm conglomerates investing in Africa, such
as Sime Darby, Wilmar, and Golden Agri-Resources, are based in
either Malaysia or Singapore, and considering their expansion con-
straintswithin Southeast Asia, it is unsurprising that palmoil produc-
tion is the primary driver of investment for these countries
(constituting88.5%of the areaacquiredby investors fromthese coun-
tries). The geographic concentration of Southeast Asian companies in
West and Central Africa is thus a reﬂection of their crop, rather than
geographic, interests. As opposed to European investors, these inves-
tors are less inclined toproduce palm-based biodiesel and target pri-
marily the global food and pharmaceutical end-market.20
Since India is still largely self-sufﬁcient in most major food com-
modities,with the exception of pulses and vegetable oil (FAO, 2013),
like Southeast Asian investors, its investors are driven less by
domestic market needs, but more by domestic expansion con-
straints. As a result of high population pressures, escalating land
prices, fragmented landholdings, water shortages, and regulatory
obstacles, gaining access to large contiguous areas of land in India
for commercial agriculture is becoming prohibitively difﬁcult (Row-
den, 2011; Carmody, 2013). The importance of globalmarket oppor-
tunities, rather than domestic market needs, in driving these19 According to their National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP), the UK,
Germany, and Italy expect that total imports will constitute 88%, 59% and 39% of their
total biofuel consumption by 2020, respectively. The UK is anticipated to become the
EU’s largest biofuel importer by 2020, expected to account for 34% of all EU biofuel
imports (derived from Atanasiu, 2010).
20 Due to the reluctance of their home governments to enforce biodiesel blending
mandates, the comparatively high global price of crude palm oil over recent years
relative to crude oil prices, and the imposition of regulatory obstacles in accessing the
EU biofuel market have deterred most Southeast Asia oil palm companies from
investing in biodiesel reﬁneries (Schoneveld et al., 2010).investments is reﬂected in the primary target crops of Indian inves-
tors. As regards traditional Indian export crops, for example, Indian
investors are the second largest investors in sugarcane cultivation
(after SouthAfrica) and the largest in tea andcotton.Although Indian
investors are also proliﬁc in the production of oilseeds, not a single
Indian investor targeted pulses as their focal crop, despite it being
the most important crop-type from the perspective of Indian food
security.21While Indian investors are oftendepicted as producing sta-
ple crops for its own consumption, the data suggests that investors in
such crops constitute only a minority (nine out of 48 investors, six of
which cultivating rice). South African investors have exhibited similar
tendencies: faced by growing barriers to accessing farmland domesti-
cally, its white commercial farmers are actively negotiating access to
farmland beyond national boundaries.22 With a well-established
domestic export-oriented sugar sector, many South African sugar
companies have also sought to overcome domestic land constraints
by acquiring land in other countries in Southern Africa.
The only investors to actively target their market of origin for the
purpose of alleviating domestic food insecurity originate predomi-
nantly from chronically food-insecure countries in North Africa and
theMiddle East. For example, 66.8% of the area acquired by Djibouti,
Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia was for the purpose of cultivating cer-
eal crops, primarily rice (hence are concentrated predominantly in
traditional rice producing countries). The vastmajority of these pro-
jects are either state-owned or linked to Emirati royalty. The prom-
inent role of state actors, as compared to other countries, except
China, suggests that the state plays a critical role in aligning invest-
ment objectives with domestic food security objectives.
Since China, like India, is largely self-sufﬁcient in its staple food
crops, most of its investors have targeted an array of traditional
cash/export crops, highlighting the predominantly commercial
objective of its investors.Withmore than 50% of ChineseGDPgener-
ated by state-owned companies (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011), the
comparatively high proportion of state-owned companies investing
in African farmland reﬂects merely China’s economic structure and
not necessarily its investment motives. While not necessarily con-
stituting a clear trend, with China being the largest rubber investor
in sub-Saharan Africa in the period under review (38.5% of the total
area acquired for rubber and 30.6% of the area acquired by Chinese
investors), highlights also itsmore industrial orientation. In contrast
to conventional wisdom, recent Chinese investments are not aimed
at securing land to grow food crops for Chinese consumption; even
China’s ofﬁcial policy guidance catalogues promote overseas invest-
ments in traditional cash crops and not cereal crops (Bräutigam and
Zhang, 2013). Some African countries even import cereals from Chi-
na (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013).
US investors neither exhibit a clear sectoral orientation, with
investments spanning across crops and sectors. Although it is ex-
pected to become a major net biofuel importer like the EU, it is
anticipated to remain self-sufﬁcient for biodiesel and to import
most of its future ethanol from Brazil (OECD–FAO, 2011).23 Hence,
its investors are likely driven largely by opportunities within global
commodity markets rather than speciﬁc domestic market opportuni-
ties. Moreover, the prominent role of the US, and also the UK and21 None of the Indian food crop investors interviewed in Ethiopia expressed an
interest in exporting to India either. Due to high transportation costs and compar-
atively high regional market prices, most crops, including staple crops such as maize,
were sold locally or regionally.
22 Land is being acquired through its commercial farmer organization Agri SA. Land
has already been allocated to its members in the Republic of the Congo, a framework
agreement has been signed in Mozambique, and negotiations are ongoing in Ghana,
South Sudan, and Zambia (Agri SA, 2011).
23 Although many African countries have been granted trade privileges under the
AGOA, the removal in 2012 of contentious US tariffs on Brazilian ethanol has eroded
ethanol trade opportunities, especially since Brazil is the cheapest ethanol producer
(Kojima and Johnson, 2005).
Fig. 4. Origin of non-domestic investments > 2000 ha, by total land area acquired. Note: When projects are registered in offshore ﬁnancial centers despite being
headquartered elsewhere, the latter is considered to be the origin of investment. Furthermore, where projects have been originated in the form of a partnership or joint
venture agreement, only the origin of the investor with the majority share is included.
Table 4
Projects led by established entities.
Origin Number of projects
led by established
entities
Number of
projects led by
start-ups
Proportion of projects
led by established
entities (%)
UK 1 56 1.75
US 9 32 21.95
Germany 4 13 23.53
Italy 15 8 65.22
India 35 13 72.92
Norway 9 3 75.00
Malaysia 4 1 80.00
China 15 2 88.24
Portugal 18 2 90.00
Singapore 11 0 100.00
Note: ‘Project led by established entities’ include those projects where the largest
shareholdings are held by an industry incumbent. Conversely, projects initiated by
‘new market entrants’ are those led by investors that have no formal afﬁliation with
industry incumbents.
25 While offering an indication into major land use conﬂicts, it should be recognized
that the concept of ’available land’ is highly contentious and cannot be determined
solely through remote sensing analyses. For example, since those typically follow FAO
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of other countries, which could also partly explain their greater geo-
graphically diffusion.24 For example, compared especially to Asian
investors, where the majority of lead investors are (subsidiaries of)
established agribusinesses or conglomerates, most projects from
the US, UK, and Germany involve new market entrants (Table 4).
These projects are typically established by individuals with support
from either private capital, alternative stock exchanges, or venture
capital and private equity funds; typically ﬁnancial sources with a
considerably higher risk propensity. However, in the context of the
global credit-crunch, while most Asian investors are still actively
developing their investment projects, most UK- and US-based pro-
jects have in the absence of secure ﬁnancial backing either bank-
rupted or temporarily ceased operations. Large UK- and US-based
agribusinesses, such as, for example, Bunge and Cargill, have either
focused their expansion plans on traditional export markets within
Latin America or, like Dunlop Tyres and Unilever, have divesting
from direct production in Africa altogether.24 For example, some investors could be more inclined to pursue speciﬁc oppor-
tunities to obtain large areas of land cheaply than carefully evaluating the risks and
merits of different countries and crops through expensive feasibility studies.Understanding potential host country impacts
Threat of land use competition
Analysis of the competing uses of agro-ecologically suitable land
offer valuable insights into the relative productivity of the different
crops in agricultural/densely populated and forested areas. By con-
trasting suitability with availability one can assess the relative risk
of land use competition in the absence of mechanisms to effectively
regulate land conversion.25 Since governments inmostmajor invest-
ment destinations are ill-equipped or are disinclined to adequately
regulate farmland investments – for example, because of new oppor-
tunities for rent-seeking or the perceived need to attract foreign cap-
ital – few effective checks and balances are in practice placed on land
use change to plantation agriculture or forestry (German et al., 2013;
Schoneveld, 2013). Preliminary evidence has shown that this could
lead to a loss of biodiversity and forest cover (Gordon-Maclean
et al., 2009; Rahmato, 2011; Nguiffo and Schwartz, 2012; Schoneveld,
2013), in turn detracting from the potential contribution of biofuels
to improving the carbon balance, and displace traditional livelihood
activities due to inadequate statutory protection of customary user
claims, which in turn undermines local food and income security
(Schoneveld et al., 2011; Väth, 2012; Shete, 2013).
Fig. 5 shows the areas of suitable land that overlap with agricul-
tural and/or densely populated land and with forests for the four
most prominent investment crops. On aggregate, of the total area
of land suitable for agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, 74.8% is
found to be under competing uses, particularly other agricultural
activities, with approximately 361.3 million ha potentially avail-
able out of a total of 1.431 billion ha that is suitable for crop pro-
duction. To date, only Ethiopia and Mozambique have made
nation-wide efforts to spatially plan investments to minimize land
use conﬂicts; though both suffer from limitations, such as lack ofAgro-Ecological Zoning (AEZ) methods and classiﬁcations, such analyses typically fail
to capture land fallowed for more than ﬁve years, forestry uses, or periodic and
seasonal land uses such as pastoralism and opportunistic agriculture, which, in the
African context, deserve to be accounted for since such lands do retain important
long-term social and economic functions.
Fig. 5. Proportion of suitable land under competing uses. Source: Own computa-
tions based on ESA (2011), UNEP (2012), and IIASA (2012).
Table 5
Farmland investments and land availability in key investment destinations.
Country Total area potentially
available (ha)
Land acquired, as % of total
available land (%)
Category 1
data
All data
categories
Sierra Leone 389,450 305.48 332.47
Liberia 700,650 153.56 153.56
Nigeria 769,850 86.74 101.81
Ghana 2,076,400 93.35 99.53
Ethiopia 7,750,050 28.54 28.54
Senegal 3,209,150 14.72 19.24
Mozambique 12,456,300 14.82 16.88
Gabon 2,456,600 16.28 16.28
Republic of the
Congo
6,816,200 12.23 13.11
Zambia 15,699,950 11.70 12.39
Tanzania 7,144,900 8.33 12.07
South Sudan 22,860,000 6.36 8.38
Mali 10,630,850 6.77 6.90
Cameroon 5,510,050 5.47 6.74
Madagascar 28,216,300 5.39 6.26
DR Congo 17,810,350 1.61 2.00
Kenya 17,302,100 1.81 1.85
Sub-Saharan
Africa
361,284,550 5.33 6.29
Source: ‘Potentially available land’ calculated from ESA (2011), UNEP (2012), and
IIASA (2012) – see ‘Methodology’ for details.
26 The RSB has certiﬁed the sugarcane-based ethanol project Addax in Sierra Leone.
The other six projects were either small in extent than 2000 ha or involved only
groups and cooperatives of smallholders.
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maps, and limited on-the-ground veriﬁcation (Schut et al., 2010
Schoneveld and Shete, 2014). Although some countries (e.g. Ghana,
Mozambique, Tanzania, South Sudan, and Uganda) have since the
1990s begun to extend legal recognition to customary user rights
without requiring legal formalization (Alden Wily, 2011, 2012a;
Amanor, 2012), as a result of poor implementation and enforce-
ment of land laws, elite capture, and limited capacity of land users
to claim their legal rights, even in these ‘best-practice’ countries
the outcomes of farmland investments do not differ materially
from countries with more repressive land laws, such as Ethiopia
and Nigeria (German et al., 2013; Schoneveld, 2013).
The threat that farmland investments compete with other land
uses does, however, vary greatly between countries (Table 5).
These risks are found to be particularly high in West Africa. In Libe-
ria and Sierra Leone, where, respectively, only 7.2% and 6.1% of
suitable land is found to be potentially available, more land has
been acquired for investment than is potentially available. In West
Africa, land acquisitions are threatening to conﬂict particularly
with subsistence agriculture (Fig. 6). In the Congo Basin, particu-
larly in Gabon and Republic of Congo, it is particularly rainforest
that is threatening to be converted, with 93.2% and 85.6% of
suitable land classiﬁed as forest.Although the proportion of total suitable and available land ac-
quired in countries such as Madagascar and South Sudan is signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than other major investment destinations, due to
the absence of regulations to guide land allocations and the ten-
dency of themost strategically located lands (e.g. those close toma-
jor ports and marketing centers) to already be densely populated
and intensively used that does not necessarily imply that socio-eco-
nomic impacts are less profound. For example, new public–private
spatial development initiatives aimedat attracting large-scale farm-
land investments, such as the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor
(BAGC) in Mozambique, the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor
of Tanzania (SAGCOT), the Green Belt Initiative in Malawi, and the
Farm Block Development Program (FBDP) in Zambia, are located
along important transportation corridors,which, due to their strate-
gic location, are likely to conﬂictwith important anthropogenic land
uses. Moreover, in countries such as Kenya, Mali, South Sudan, and
Tanzania, availability assessment will, due to inherentmethodolog-
ical constraints (see footnote 25), fail to capture some of the impor-
tant agro-pastoral livelihood systems that ‘available’ semi-arid,
though potentially productive, landscapes in these countries often
support. Conversely, preliminary evidence has shown that some
investors purposely target densely land of high conservation value;
for example, in order to recuperate establishment costs by harvest-
ing valuable timber species within the project area (Gordon-Ma-
clean et al., 2009; Rainforest Foundation, 2013; Schoneveld, 2013).
Although the threat of land use competition could arguably be
minimized when existing plantations are acquired, only 54 pro-
jects, covering 7.9% of the area acquired, concerned land used for
plantation agriculture or forestry prior to 2005. Such projects typ-
ically involve colonial or early post-Independence era tree crop es-
tates in countries such as DRC, Liberia, and Nigeria. However, as
case studies in Nigeria have shown, as a result of demographic
shifts that accompany boom and busts, many of these estates have
experienced heavy encroachment. Therefore, despite more limited
direct environmental effects, the socio-economic effects of estate
rehabilitation are often more profound than Greenﬁeld develop-
ments (Schoneveld, 2014).
Even though host country governments in practice have negligi-
ble inﬂuence over project siting, third party certiﬁcation systems
involving periodic performance audits are increasingly being em-
braced by investors as a means ameliorate reputational risk. Since
many such ‘soft’ regulation schemes require investors to respect
customary land rights and the right to self-determination and to
avoid ecologically signiﬁcant landscapes, they could in theory
serve to minimize land use competition and resolve public good
problems arising from the ‘hard’ regulation vacuum. However,
emergent schemes such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm
Oil (RSPO), Bonsucro, Round Table on Responsive Soy (RTRS),
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), and International Sus-
tainability and Carbon Certiﬁcation (ISCC), while gaining traction
in Latin America and Southeast Asia, are failing to gain critical mass
in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, while six of the largest
schemes certiﬁed a total of 1612 projects by the September
2013, only seven were located in Africa, involving only one of the
563 projects proﬁled in this research (Table 6).26 Further research
would be needed to identify factors underlying low adoption rates
in Africa, although early evidence suggests that some companies
may have underestimated the complexity of African land property
relations (Schoneveld, 2013). Moreover, since most sugarcane and
oil palm companies are targeting local and emerging markets, where,
arguably, certiﬁcation has, in contrast to Northern markets, little
Fig. 6. Map of suitability overlaps. Source: Own representation, based on ESA (2011), IIASA (2012).
Table 6
Number of active certiﬁed projects for biomass production in September 2013.
Certiﬁcation scheme Sub-Saharan Africa Europe Latin America Australasia North America Asia North Africa and the Middle East Total
2bsvs 0 412 63 12 0 0 0 487
RSB 1(1) 1 2 1 2 0 0 7
Bonsucro 0 1 11 1 0 0 0 13
ISCC 5(0) 671 25 5 29 117 4 856
RSPO 1(0) 0 5 10 0 205 0 221
RTRS 0 0 17 0 4 7 0 28
Total 7(1) 1085 123 29 35 329 4 1612
Source: Datasets from individual schemes.
Note: Numbers in brackets depict the number of projects captured by the dataset used in this study.
Table 7
Number of projects that received ﬁnancial support from major development banks by September 2013.
Development bank Sub-Saharan Africa Europe Latin America Australasia North America Asia North Africa and the Middle East Total
MIGA 6(3) 1 1 0 0 0 0 8
IFC 8(4) 2 16 0 0 2 0 28
AfDB 2(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
SwedFund 1(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Proparco 3(0) 0 1 0 0 2 1 7
NorFund 8(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
CDC 4(1) 0 1 0 0 7 0 12
Total 32(15) 3 19 0 0 11 1 66
Source: Datasets from individual development banks.
Note: Numbers in brackets depict the number of projects captured by the dataset used in this study.
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Table 8
Potential contribution of documented biofuel projects to energy security.
Country Value of net oil imports, as
% of GDP (%)
Blending mandates
(targets in brackets)
Biodiesel prod. potential, as % of total petro-
diesel consumption a (%)
Ethanol prod. potential, as % of total
gasoline consumptiona (%)
Angola 0 (E10) 13.33 29.00
Ethiopia 4.9 E10 in Addis Ababa 37.27 27.06
Ghana 9.2 (E10/B10) 66.53 12.85
Kenya 7.6 E10 in Kisumu 18.46 24.99
Liberia 16.5 None 105.24 0.00
Madagascar 6.9 None 606.67 369.02
Malawi 5.9 E10 6.90 0.00
Mali 1.9 None 933.78 80.48
Mozambique 5.1 E10/B5 by 2015 98.88 465.14
Nigeria 0 (E10) 67.33 2.17
Senegal 9.6 None 30.92 0.00
Sierra Leone 14.5 None 163.74 43.66
Tanzania 5.1 None 68.00 80.31
Zambia 3.6 (E10/B5) 1273.31 67.10
Zimbabwe n/a E5 0.00 275.12
Sources: ‘Value of net oil imports, as % of GDP’ derived from EIA (2012) and World Bank (2013b); ‘Blending mandates’ derived from individual country laws and policies;
‘Ethanol and biodiesel production potential’ derived from own data, UN, 2012.
a Caloriﬁc differences between petroleum products and biofuel products are accounted for using the conversion factors adopted from USDA FAS (2009): 1000 l of
ethanol = 0.507 toe; 1000 l of biodiesel = 0.788 toe. Yield of biofuel per hectare used in the calculations is conservatively estimated at: jatropha = 1000 l/ha; oil palm = 4000 l/
ha; castor = 800 l/ha; sunﬂower = 800 l/ha; cassava = 2000 l/ha; sweet sorghum = 5000 l/ha (assuming 2 harvests per year); pongamia = 1800 l/ha; rapeseed = 1100 l/ha;
croton megalocarpus = 1500 l/ha.
Table 9
Potential contribution of cereal projects to food security.
Country Global
Hunger
Index
Total domestic
cereal production,
as % of total
consumption (%)
Area of cereal
investment,
as % of total area
harvesteda (%)
Angola 24.2 42.13 2.30
Burkina Faso 17.2 77.12 0.08
Cameroon 17.7 67.42 4.54
DRC 39.0 53.09 1.01
Ethiopia 28.7 88.21 0.66
Ghana 8.7 63.25 2.58
Liberia 21.5 32.53 6.06
Madagascar 22.5 80.79 0.29
Mali 19.7 108.51 4.07
Mauritania 12.7 26.37 17.53
Mozambique 22.7 55.68 0.99
Nigeria 15.5 84.88 1.19
Sierra Leone 25.2 94.60 0.83
Tanzania 20.5 89.11 3.19
Zambia 24.0 82.03 4.46
Sub-Saharan Africa 77.13 1.10
Source: ‘Global Hunger Index’ from IFPRI (2012); ‘Total domestic cereal production’
derived from FAO (2013); ‘Area of cereal investment’ derived from own data, FAO,
2013.
a This indicator calculates the total area of land acquired by investors for cereal
crop production, as a proportion of total land area harvested for cereal crops in the
country in 2012. This gives an indication by what factor total cereal production
might increase should these investments come to full fruition.
27 However, most countries permit the full repatriation of proﬁts, which could
threaten to offset the contribution of foreign exchange earnings from biofuel
exportation to the current account balance.
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gel, 2006; McCarthy and Zen, 2010).
Another area where the adoption of sustainability standards is
prevalent is further upstream in the value chain in project ﬁnance.
The IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sus-
tainability, formally adopted in 1998 and revised in 2006 and
2012, is widely considered to be an important benchmark for pro-
ject ﬁnance. It is applied to IFC and Multilateral Investment Guar-
antee Agency (MIGA) ﬁnancing decisions and is often adopted as
part of due diligence procedures by other development bank. In
contrast to media portrayal, however, development banks are not
prominent ﬁnanciers of large-scale farmland investments in Africa.
As illustrated by Table 7, while the largest number of development
bank-funded projects related to biomass production are located in
sub-Saharan Africa, with only 15 out of 32 relevant development
bank-funded projects captured by the dataset.Alignment with domestic market needs
As discussed above, the anticipated growth in global biofuel
consumption is a major driver of investment. With sub-Saharan
Africa being the most vulnerable region in the world to oil price
shocks (with the value of oil imports equivalent to 5.5% of GDP,
in contrast to a global average of 2.8%) (Schoneveld, 2010), the
development of domestic alternative energy markets could help
alleviate the macro-economic instability associated with global
oil price ﬂuctuations. However, as shown in Table 8, few countries
in sub-Saharan Africa are actively encouraging domestic biofuel
uptake (e.g. through blending mandates); in most countries, legal
provisions to that effect are entirely absent or are based solely
on non-regulated targets. Blending is currently being undertaken
only in selected cities in Ethiopia and Kenya and nation-wide in
Malawi and Zimbabwe. Experience to date has shown that sub-
stantial public investments are needed in mass storage and blend-
ing facilities and periodic subsidies to offset price differentials (e.g.
between a crop’s food use and fuel prices) (Jumbe et al., 2009;
Schoneveld et al., 2010). Considering high opportunity costs of
public funds, many African countries have as a result been reluc-
tant to follow through on renewable energy plans.
Without a guaranteed domestic market, in the medium-term,
domestically produced biofuels will largely be destined for export
markets (especially the EU). This tendency will be reinforced by the
global price differentials created by market distortions in the man-
dated EU and US markets. Land use change to biofuel feedstock cul-
tivation is, therefore, largely a product of global markets, not
domestic demand. Considering that in most countries that have at-
tracted biofuel investments, the hypothetical production capacity
of these investments exceeds a typical 10% ethanol (E10) and bio-
diesel (B10) blending mandate by multiple factors (Table 8), high-
lights the importance of developing domestic capacities to
effectively capitalize on this production potential.
While the macro-economic contribution of most biofuel pro-
jects is largely limited to enhancing foreign exchange earnings,
greater societal beneﬁts could be derived from the food projects.27
Not only could these contribute to local food availability, but, like
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reducing dependency on imports. For net food buying households,
which in many African countries is the majority of the rural popula-
tion, food price ﬂuctuations can severely undermine household
capacity to meet basic needs (Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik, 2008). Most
households are susceptible in particular to changes in the price for
cereal, which typically constitute between 40% and 60% of total cal-
oriﬁc intake (FAO, 2012). However, sub-Saharan Africa is only able to
meet 77% of cereal demand through domestic production, with the
remainder sourced from external markets.
Despite this, as discussed in the preceding section, few invest-
ments explicitly target this sector. As can be observed from Table 9,
the hypothetical cereal production capacity of documented invest-
ments to date is in most countries equivalent to a fraction of total
area harvested for cereal crops. Therefore, it is unlikely that these
investments will make structural contributions to national cereal
self-sufﬁciency. Moreover, since many projects are led by inves-
tors from countries that too are food insecure and have strong ties
to the governments from their countries of origin, an imperative to
export is likely. For example, the cereal investments in Mauritania
(equivalent to a comparatively sizeable 17.5% of area harvested)
all originate from Saudi Arabia, while in Liberia these originate
from Libya. This, however, does not imply that all cereals will
necessarily be exported; Ethiopia and Tanzania, for example,
periodically put in place temporary cereal export bans to manage
price ﬂuctuations.28 Moreover, due to high transportation costs,
lesser proﬁtable cereal crops such as maize that are produced
under purely commercial conditions will likely target domestic
markets.29
Conclusion
This article has highlighted the complex interplay of factors that
shape the geographic and sectoral patterns of farmland invest-
ments in sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
the majority of investors were found to originate from Europe
and North America, rather than Asia and the Middle East. More-
over, the most signiﬁcant impetus has undeniably been artiﬁcial
EU biofuel demand and favorable trade conditions for high-value
cash crops, rather than food security. Since Northern investors also
have a greater propensity to invest in unproven crops such as jatro-
pha and not to be supported by established entities also points at
the role of speculation and risk capital in enabling these invest-
ment ﬂows. Although Chinese and Indian investors are often impli-
cated for investing in staple crops for their own consumption, in
reality, investors from both countries are more inclined towards
the cultivation of traditional export crops, and, where staple crops
are cultivated, these tend to be marketed locally. Examples from
investments originating from chronically-insecure countries in
North Africa and the Middle East, albeit comparatively minor, high-
light how home country government participation is a prerequisite
for aligning investment objectives with domestic food security
objectives; with most private investors naturally disposed to tar-
geting more proﬁtable cash crops.
Although some countries are clearly more preferred invest-
ment destinations than others, as opposed to the popular por-
trayal of investors actively exploiting countries with weak
governance regimes, this study shows that a country’s relative
attractiveness for investors is shaped by a host of insufﬁciently
quantiﬁable factors. This includes historical, cultural, economic,
and political relations between host and home country, access28 However, in Ethiopia, agreements are in place with a Saudi rice investor and a
government of Djibouti wheat project that exempts them from this ban.
29 Maize investors interviewed in Ethiopia and Zambia for this reason sold
exclusively on the domestic market.to local social and business networks, established markets and
infrastructure, and, perhaps most importantly, domestic crop-spe-
ciﬁc support and incentives, notably for oil palm, sugarcane, and
rice.
Despite a wide diversity of drivers, most investors are ulti-
mately driven by the same issue, namely declining domestic re-
source access or availability and expansion constraints. While
some argue that this places host countries in an economically
advantageous position, it is questionable whether these extra-ter-
ritorial resource constraints are effectively exploited by host coun-
try governments. Findings suggest that due to market composition
(few domestic investors), market orientation (oriented towards ex-
port markets), and type of product (dominance of biofuels), besides
foreign exchange earnings, these farmland investments are unli-
kely to make far-reaching contributions to domestic market needs.
Research has shown that mechanisms to capture potential gains
are also typically lacking and host governments tend to be ill-
equipped or unwilling to effectively regulate these investments.
Consequently, socio-economically and environmentally valuable
land is increasingly concentrating with (expatriate) capitalist inter-
ests, typically on terms that do not reﬂect the land’s true economic
value. However, advocacy campaigns by civil society organizations
(CSO) in countries such as Cameroon, Liberia, Mozambique, Tanza-
nia, and Senegal do show that important domestic processes of col-
lective action are emerging around these issues, which has the
potential to evolve into an important counterbalance to insufﬁ-
ciently accountable state institutions. While CSO’s could play an
important intermediary and representative role in the land alien-
ation process (e.g. in ensuring principles of free, prior, and in-
formed consent are respected and issues related to inequalities of
arms are overcome), since negotiation processes over land are of-
ten opaque and non-inclusive, in practice CSO’s tend to miss
opportunities to that effect. Despite this, CSO’s could make impor-
tant contributions to enhancing community capacity to claim their
legal rights in the context of rights infringement and campaign for
the adoption of simple and enforceable safeguards. This could in-
volve increasing land rental rates, allocation of (parts of) land rev-
enues to host communities, reducing the duration of leaseholds,
return of the land to host communities upon expiration of lease-
holds, and allocating returns from foreclosure to host
communities.
Despite the geopolitical signiﬁcance of the problem, interna-
tional regulatory frameworks at present have little direct bearing
on the practices of foreign investors or are able to address gaps
in host country governance. Although non-state, market-based
instruments, such as voluntary certiﬁcation systems and adher-
ence to bank sustainability standards, are gaining reputational va-
lue, there relevance in Africa has to date been negligible.
Additionally, issues of national sovereignty and World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) rules on protectionism deter consumer country
governments from excessive interference in extra-territorial pro-
duction.30 Therefore, with both the market and consumer countries
failing to adequately internalize and regulate the negative external-
ities of global resources scarcities, in order for farmland investments
to translate into tangible developmental opportunities, greater
emphasis should be placed on identifying and addressing the struc-
tural issues that underlie host country governance deﬁciencies and
promoting alternative, more sustainable and inclusive, business
models.30 The biofuel sustainability standards of the EU Renewable Energy Directive do
require operators seeking to market biofuels within the EU to meet minimal
environmental criteria; however, for technical, legal, and political reasons, the EC has
been reluctant to introduce social criteria (German and Schoneveld, 2012).
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Table A1. Target countries.Target
country
Data quality category Total Number of
projectsCategory 1 Category 2 Category 1
(conditional)
Gambia 0 10,000 10,000 1
Burkina Faso 2000 3000 5000 2
Mauritius 2500 2500 1
Togo 2700 3023 5723 2
Sao Tome & Principe 5000 5000 1
Central African Republic 13,838 13,838 2
Niger 15,922 8472 24,394 3
Botswana 21,400 21,400 1
South Africa 29,000 29,000 2
Rwanda 39,500 8000 47,500 4
Swaziland 46,584 46,584 2
Mauritania 53,302 53,302 4
Malawi 82,001 82,001 5
Benin 98,288 200,000 298,288 3
Cote d’Ivoire 103,222 10,000 113,222 5
Uganda 110,449 65,000 175,449 13
Zimbabwe 149,913 149,913 3
Angola 190,150 147,000 337,150 20
Guinea 241,115 910,000 98,400 1,249,515 5
DR Congo 277,231 68,750 10,000 355,981 11
Cameroon 301,471 70,000 371,471 14
Namibia 310,000 30,000 340,000 4
Kenya 313,705 6885 320,590 7
Gabon 399,814 399,814 5
Senegal 472,350 145,000 617,350 24
Nigeria 579,082 116,000 88,718 783,800 42
Tanzania 595,473 267,000 862,473 47
Mali 719,943 14,000 733,943 28
Republic of Congo 833,930 60,000 893,930 8
South Sudan 105,4850 460,000 400,000 1,914,850 14
Liberia 1,075,903 1,075,903 11
Sierra Leone 1,184,710 105,099 5000 1,294,809 19
Madagascar 1,522,100 244,100 1,766,200 26
Ghana 1,647,216 128,310 290,682 2,066,208 45
Ethiopia 1,745,833 466,000 2,211,833 91
Zambia 1,836,994 109,000 1,945,994 25
Mozambique 1,846,500 256,027 2,102,527 63
Total 17,923,991 3,444,666 1,358,800 22,727,457 563
Table A2. Origin of lead companies (non-domestic).
Origin of
lead
Data quality categories Total Number of
projectsCategory 1 Category 2 Category 1
(conditional)
South Korea 0 15,000 15,000 1
Vietnam 0 30,000 30,000 1
Mexico 2000 2000 1
Australia 9500 9500 1
Austria 10,000 10,000 1
Burkina Faso 10,000 10,000 1
Cote d’Ivoire 10,000 10,000 2
Sudan 11,302 11,302 1
Iran 12,117 12,117 2
(continued on next page)
(continued)
Origin of
lead
Data quality categories Total Number of
projectsCategory 1 Category 2 Category 1
(conditional)
Uganda 13,000 13,000 1
Zimbabwe 13,000 13,000 1
Finland 19,600 19,600 1
Luxembourg 23,000 23,000 1
UAE 25,983 25,983 2
Kenya 27,885 27,885 3
Pakistan 28,000 15,000 43,000 1
Turkey 31,000 31,000 4
Nigeria 40,000 40,000 1
Cyprus 50,000 50,000 1
Mauritius 54,584 6885 61,469 6
Spain 58,508 70,000 128,508 6
Japan 59,154 30,000 89,154 3
Djibouti 59,823 59,823 2
Brazil 73,100 75,000 148,100 7
Indonesia 80,000 80,000 1
Denmark 93,692 93,692 5
Lebanon 100,000 100,000 1
New Zealand 108,000 108,000 1
Egypt 133,895 133,895 3
Netherlands 135,732 20,000 155,732 11
Belgium 140,244 100,000 240,244 8
Libya 160,000 160,000 4
Sweden 302,155 50,000 352,155 3
Saudi Arabia 335,401 20,000 355,401 16
France 358,203 21,472 5000 384,676 20
Switzerland 403,505 25,000 428,505 5
South Africa 491,599 144,174 635,773 22
Canada 499,092 28,000 527,092 9
Italy 515,363 1,037,505 88,718 1,641,586 23
Singapore 520,338 40,000 560,338 11
Israel 538,000 0 538,000 7
China 562,394 40,000 602,394 17
Portugal 695,612 87,000 782,612 20
Malaysia 812,487 90,000 902,487 5
Germany 940,071 3023 943,095 17
Norway 983,659 29,0682 1,274,341 12
India 1,381,334 264,300 351,000 1,996,634 48
United States 1,813,744 484,750 498,400 2,796,895 41
United Kingdom 2,127,055 353,028 2,480,084 57
Total 14,873,134 2,935,137 1,348,800 19,157,071 418
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